Newshound, Author at Marine Surveyor Australia | IIMS Australia - Certified Marine Surveyors

Counterfeit pilot ladders warning issued by AMSA

Cape Northumberland Lighthouse restored after birds eat stonework

AMSA Board to commence search for new CEO

Lithium-ion battery safety: A series of fires on recreational vessels have been linked to lithium-ion battery powered devices

Marine Order 12 revision by AMSA effective from January 1st 2024

Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) update November 2023

Ensuring safe access to Australian domestic commercial vessels

MPV Everest engine room fire report published

AMSA update October 2023

AMSA publishes its National Compliance Plan 2023-24

Reports & Bulletins

Issue: December 2024

Issue: September 2025

Issue: November 2025

IIMS On-Demand Training Portal

Lithium-ion battery fires: What we know so far

NTSB: loose wire on containership Dali led to Scott Key Bridge collision

[caption id="attachment_51423" align="alignright" width="385"] The containership Dali with portions of the collapsed Francis Scott Key Bridge across its forward deck. (Source: NTSB)[/caption]

The US National Transportation Safety Board said a single loose wire on the Dali containership caused an electrical blackout that led to the vessel hitting the Francis Scott Key Bridge, which then collapsed, killing six highway workers.

At a public meeting, investigators said the loose wire in the ship’s electrical system caused a breaker to unexpectedly open - beginning a sequence of events that led to two vessel blackouts and a loss of both propulsion and steering near the 2.37-mile-long Key Bridge on March 26, 2024. Investigators found that wire-label banding prevented the wire from being fully inserted into a terminal block spring-clamp gate, causing an inadequate connection.

[caption id="attachment_57846" align="aligncenter" width="385"] Illustration showing how placement of wire-label banding affects the way wires are seated in their terminal blocks. (Source: NTSB)[/caption]

[caption id="attachment_57847" align="aligncenter" width="385"] Illustration showing how placement of wire-label banding affects the way wires are seated in their terminal blocks. (Source: NTSB)[/caption]

fter the initial blackout, the Dali’s heading began swinging to starboard toward Pier 17 of the Key Bridge. Investigators found that the pilots and the bridge team attempted to change the vessel’s trajectory, but the loss of propulsion so close to the bridge rendered their actions ineffective. A substantial portion of the bridge subsequently collapsed into the river, and portions of the pier, deck and truss spans collapsed onto the vessel’s bow and forwardmost container bays.

A seven-person road maintenance crew and one inspector were on the bridge when the vessel struck. Six of the highway workers died. The NTSB found that the quick actions of the Dali pilots, shoreside dispatchers and the Maryland Transportation Authority to stop bridge traffic prevented greater loss of life.

“Our investigators routinely accomplish the impossible, and this investigation is no different,’ said NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy. “The Dali, at almost 1,000 feet, is as long as the Eiffel Tower is high, with miles of wiring and thousands of electrical connections. Finding this single wire was like hunting for a loose rivet on the Eiffel Tower.

“But like all of the accidents we investigate,this was preventable,” Homendy said. “Implementing NTSB recommendations in this investigation will prevent similar tragedies in the future.”

Contributing to the collapse of the Key Bridge and the loss of life was the lack of countermeasures to reduce the bridge’s vulnerability to collapse due to impact by ocean-going vessels, which have only grown larger since the Key Bridge’s opening in 1977. When the Japan-flagged containership Blue Nagoya contacted the Key Bridge after losing propulsion in 1980, the 390-foot-long vessel caused only minor damage. The Dali, however, is 10 times the size of the Blue Nagoya.

[caption id="attachment_57848" align="aligncenter" width="385"] The comparative sizes of the Blue Nagoya and the Dali relative to the Key Bridge. Source: NTSB[/caption]

As part of the investigation, the NTSB in March released an initial report on the vulnerability of bridges nationwide to large vessel strikes. The report found that the Maryland Transportation Authority—and many other owners of bridges spanning navigable waterways used by ocean-going vessels—were likely unaware of the potential risk that a vessel collision could pose to their structures. This was despite longstanding guidance from the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials recommending that bridge owners perform these assessments.

The NTSB sent letters to 30 bridge owners identified in the report, urging them to evaluate their bridges and, if needed, develop plans to reduce risks. All recipients have since responded, and the status of each recommendation is available on the NTSB’s website.

As a result of the investigation, the NTSB issued new safety recommendations to the US Coast Guard; US Federal Highway Administration; the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials; the Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK); the American National Standards Institute; the American National Standards Institute Accredited Standards Committee on Safety in Construction and Demolitions Operations A10; HD Hyundai Heavy Industries; Synergy Marine Pte. Ltd; and WAGO Corporation, the electrical component manufacturer; and multiple bridge owners across the nation.

The post NTSB: loose wire on containership Dali led to Scott Key Bridge collision appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

MCA published its new Sport or Pleasure Code

Safety and innovation are at the heart of updated regulations for small commercial vessels used for sport or pleasure that was laid before Parliament on 20 November 2025 with application to be phased in from 12 December 2025 by the...

The post MCA published its new Sport or Pleasure Code appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

TSB Canada highlights importance of safeguards to prevent accidental lifeboat releases

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is urging stronger safety measures after a crew member was seriously injured aboard the bulk carrier Golden Zhejiang’s lifeboat in 2023. The TSB highlights the need for proper procedures for risk assessments, equipment-specific training, and a safety management system supported by a mature safety culture with a trusted process for communication between crew and shore personnel to prevent accidental lifeboat releases.

What happened

On September 2, 2023, the second and fourth engineers were carrying out a weekly safety check of the Golden Zhejiang’s free-fall lifeboat, while the vessel was anchored in Trincomali Channel, British Columbia. During the check, the second engineer encountered an issue while testing the steering from inside the lifeboat and attempted to troubleshoot the problem. In the process, the main release mechanism was inadvertently activated. The sudden drop caused the securing cables to fail, sending the lifeboat into the water with the second engineer inside. As he was not secured in a seat, the second engineer sustained serious injuries.

Findings

These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence:

The Golden Zhejiang’s safety management system did not explicitly require a risk assessment before entering the free-fall lifeboat to conduct a safety check. Consequently, the fourth engineer and the second engineer began the weekly safety check without assessing the risks of the boat inadvertently being released.
The cables securing the lifeboat to the launching structure were not engineered and certified as load-bearing cables. Consequently, they were not safe for the intended use.
When the lifeboat was inadvertently released, the securing cables failed, causing the lifeboat to fall into the water with the second engineer inside. The second engineer was not secured in a seat and was seriously injured during the impact.

Following the incident, the vessel operator, Columbia Shipmanagement Ltd., implemented safety enhancements, including updated lifeboat labelling, revised familiarization checklists and work instructions, and installation of securing turnbuckles. This occurrence was also used as a case study in crew training seminars, and the scope of ship visits by shore management personnel was extended to include crew awareness of free-fall lifeboat safety.

Download the full report: [download id="965"]

The post TSB Canada highlights importance of safeguards to prevent accidental lifeboat releases appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

IIMS launches brand new course for lithium batteries

[caption id="attachment_57871" align="alignright" width="385"] IIMS has launched a brand new four-module course for lithium batteries[/caption]

After some months of preparation and development, IIMS has launched a new four-module course dedicated to the subject of lithium batteries, one of the most talked about and misunderstood topics in the marine surveying profession right now.

The course has been authored by leading lithium-ion battery experts David and Magda O'Neill, who are based at akuPalma in Mallorca. The course digs deep into the chemistry, as well as assessing how to survey and inspect installations of lithium batteries.

IIMS CEO, Mike Schwarz said, "My inbox has been jammed with surveyors asking about lithium batteries all year. There is such a lack of understanding on this topic and no-one is sure where to turn for advice and training. As the months rolled by, I became more and more frustrated at the lack of specific training on lithium batteries.

"Turning to David and Magda, who have presented on lithium batteries at IIMS events before, and tapping into their expert knowledge, was a natural step and I am delighted with what they have created.

"The course is technical and I am not certain we can make a general marine surveyor an expert overnight. But those who choose to study this material will gain a significant insight into the technology, coupled with the confidence and knowledge to enable them to understand what they are inspecting to know if it is a good or a bad installation.

"Education is key for not only professional marine surveyors, but also for their clients. I am delighted that IIMS has been able to take a lead by delivering this important training."

Here's what the course entails.

Modules

Part 1: Lithium Battery Chemistry and Structure h3

An introduction to the products in the lithium battery family, including the chemistry, physical build and differences in their properties.

This module covers:

Different battery chemistries, strengths and weaknesses.
Fire risk and propagation explained.
Introduction to BMS systems and different yacht battery formats.
Introduction to low voltage and high voltage systems.
C-ratings explained.

Part 2: Safety and Installation of Lithium Batteries h3

Lithium battery safety and important installation differences. This module looks into Battery Management System function and the architecture around the BMS. You will also learn how to design an installation to maximise function and minimize risk.

This module covers:

Typical integrated lithium system solutions for differing vessels.
What can the BMS control and how does it affect safety?
Comparison between physical and Mosfet isolation systems. Pros and cons.
Pre-charge explained, how and why.
Fuses and AIC rating.
Lithium batteries and the importance of safety control architecture.
The difference between classic and modern vessel core electrical concept.
Different battery packs styles and abilities.
Marine vs residential products and their weaknesses.
Importance of Alternator control systems.
Various battery core installation logics.
Cell balancing. Parallel and Series battery packs.
The transition to `Redundant´ battery systems.
Containment, IP ratings and firefighting.

Part 3: Maintenance and Electrical Installation h3

The vast majority of fires on vessels with lithium batteries originate from the installation around the batteries, not directly from the battery itself. This module aims to give you the knowledge on how to recognise a good, well installed system, when to call for guidance from expert installers, or when to just say no.

This module covers:

Risk of electrical fire vs battery chemistry induced fire.
Different cable terminals and crimping methods.
Good, clean system vs bad installations and 'red flags'.
Torque ranges and torque settings.
The importance of thermal camera checks.
HV cabling and cable terminals PowerLok and SurLok Plus type.
Wiring sizes, 300A rules and redundant systems.
Ventilation faults causing faults and failures.
Various wiring faults with case study.

Part 4: Surveying and Inspections h3

This module covers surveying and inspections of lithium installations, including fine detailing of the lithium system design and how to interact with regulations. It also summarises the vessel risk factors and failures in real life.

This module covers:

Various regulations and certifications and what they cover.
Battery/installation information useful to collect before inspection.
What do we need to check on the vessel depending on size, battery voltage and battery chemistry. When can you feel comfortable and when help of professional marine electricians with Lithium knowledge is required.
Comparison of various European marine battery manufacture guidance for LFP and NMC.
Information regarding MGN550, ISO 23625 (small craft Lithium-ion Batteries) and MGN 681 (small craft storage).
Basic inspection guidelines for LFP and NMC batteries.
Various battery types and communication systems, and how to recognize them in real life.
Balancing communication guidelines.
Summary of 300A rule and useful crib sheets regarding cable sizes.
More information regarding alternator control.
Ventilation and environmental requirements of various equipment.
Basic guidelines regarding use of thermal cameras during electrical inspections and possible issues of the vessel's fixed installations.
Case study: electrical canal boat explosion in August 2025 and photos from sister ship.
Lithium fire.
Toys on board.

Duration

This course will take between 10-12 hours to complete. The training material and content is provided in video, meaning you can study in your own time and at your own convenience. There is an assessment option available for each module too.

Fees

Each module costs £150 each, or the whole course (all four modules) is available to buy for just £500.

Find out more or sign up here

The post IIMS launches brand new course for lithium batteries appeared first on The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS).

Latest Instagram Posts